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It is argued here that expectations of bias (vs. no bias) play a key role in explaining reactions 
to decisions made by outgroup authorities. Two experiments demonstrate that decision 
acceptance (Experiment 1) and intentions to protest against an outgroup authority’s decisions 
(Experiment 2) are affected by procedural fairness when the authority has a reputation of being 
unbiased, but not when the authority’s reputation suggests bias. By contrast, some evidence is 
also found suggesting that reactions to an outgroup authority’s decisions are affected by the 
favorability of the outcome when the authority has a reputation of being biased, but not when 
the authority has a reputation of being unbiased. Mediation analyses indicate that two different 
processes account for these effects. 
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In the globalized and multicultural world of 
today, societal and organizational authorities 
are frequently faced with the challenges of man-
aging groups consisting of members of different 
subgroups. Research on procedural justice (for 
overviews, see Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Smith, 1998) has therefore 
started to examine how reactions to an authority’s 
decisions are affected by the relationship people 
have to the authority. Several studies suggest 
that procedural fairness has a relatively modest 
infl uence on people’s reactions to decisions 
when the decision-making authority is from 
an outgroup or from an ingroup that is of rela-
tively minor relevance for their social identities 
(e.g. Huo, 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 
1996; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; 
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Ståhl, Van Prooijen, & Vermunt, 2004; Tyler & 
Degoey, 1995). In such situations, people’s re-
sponses instead seem to be strongly affected by 
the favorability of decisions and decision-making 
procedures (Duck & Fielding, 2003; Huo et al., 
1996; Ståhl, Vermunt, & Ellemers, 2006). 
The primary aim of the present research is 
to examine psychological processes that may 
account for how people react to outgroup 
authorities’ decisions. More specifi cally, we set 
out to explain the weak infl uence of procedural 
fairness and the strong infl uence of outcome 
favorability frequently found on reactions to 
outgroup authorities’ decisions. In doing so, 
we also examine possibilities to enhance effects 
of procedural fairness and to reduce effects of 
outcome favorability. Our theoretical approach 
is primarily based on research on intergroup per-
ception (e.g. Duck & Fielding, 1999; Horwitz & 
Rabbie, 1989; Kramer, Shah, & Woerner, 1995; 
Moy & Ng, 1996). Based on this literature we 
will argue that expectations about outgroup 
members play an important role in explaining 
reactions to outgroup authorities’ decisions 
(cf. Duck & Fielding, 1999, 2003; Ståhl et al., 
2006). We will further argue that, by altering 
expectations about the outgroup authority, it 
is possible to direct people’s concerns toward 
the fairness of treatment and away from the 
favorability of their outcome. Finally, we will 
also explore the mediating processes accounting 
for these changes. Before we go into the details 
of the present research, however, we shall start 
off by reviewing relevant research on reactions 
to outgroup members’ decisions as well as work 
on intergroup perception. 
Reactions to outgroup members’ 
decisions
There are several studies indicating that the 
infl uence of procedural fairness on people’s 
reactions to decisions made by an authority is 
relatively weak when the authority belongs to 
a group that is less important for their social 
identities. One relevant line of research has 
been carried out by Tyler and Huo and their 
colleagues (e.g. Huo, 2003; Huo et al., 1996; 
Tyler & Degoey, 1995). The typical fi nding from 
these correlational studies is that associations 
between procedural fairness and subsequent 
reactions to decisions (e.g. decision acceptance) 
are weaker among people who do not identify 
with the group the authority represents. On 
the other hand, the same studies indicate that 
associations between outcome favorability and 
reactions to decisions become stronger the less 
people identify with the group. 
Several studies have focused on the group 
membership of the authority rather than 
on people’s level of identification with the 
group. Ståhl et al. (2004) found that while the 
fairness of procedures affected reactions to 
decisions when the authority was from an in-
group, this was generally not the case when 
the authority was from an outgroup. Smith 
et al. (1998) reported similar effects on people’s 
self-esteem. By contrast, studies suggest that 
the favorability of outcomes (Duck & Fielding, 
2003) and procedures (Ståhl et al., 2004) exerts 
particularly strong infl uence on responses when 
the authority is from an outgroup. 
But why do people react in this manner when 
faced with outgroup authorities? According 
to the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992; cf. 
Lind & Tyler, 1988), procedural fairness concerns 
are primarily relational in nature. People value a 
fair procedure because it indicates that they are 
respected and valued by the authority and by the 
group the authority represents. A consequence of 
this line of reasoning is that people should care 
less about procedural fairness as the relation-
ship to the authority and the group becomes 
less relevant for their social identities (Huo 
et al., 1996). In the present article we argue that, 
aside from having weaker relational concerns, 
there is another reason why people react to 
decisions the way they do in encounters with 
outgroup authorities—people generally expect 
them to be biased. 
The role of expectations 
The literature on intergroup perception sug-
gests that people generally perceive outgroup 
members as less trustworthy, less cooperative 
and less honest compared to ingroup members 
(e.g. Brewer, 1979). Furthermore, these negative 
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biases also generalize to behavioral expectations. 
Several studies have found that people generally 
expect outgroup members to demonstrate bias in 
favor of their own group members in evaluation 
(Vivian & Berkowitz, 1992) as well as in overt 
behavior (e.g. Duck & Fielding, 1999; Harinck & 
Ellemers, 2006; Horwitz & Rabbie, 1989; Kramer 
et al., 1995; Moy & Ng, 1996). 
Given that outgroup members are generally 
expected to be biased, a relevant question is how 
such expectations affect reactions to decision-
making procedures.1 To date, no studies have 
examined the role of expected bias in reactions 
to outgroup authorities’ decisions. However, 
in ingroup settings and when the group is less 
salient, the literature suggests that procedural 
fairness effects, such as effects of voice (Folger, 
1977), and accuracy (Leventhal, 1980) might 
be moderated by expected bias. For example, 
research on the voice effect indicates that one 
of the few conditions when positive effects of 
voice are not found is when people do not trust 
that the authority considers their views (Tyler, 
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). De Cremer (2004) 
presented more direct experimental evidence 
that expected bias can moderate the infl uence 
of procedures. Specifi cally, when an authority 
who was expected to be biased evaluated partici-
pants’ performance on various tests, procedural 
fairness judgments as well as emotional responses 
were equally negative regardless of whether 
the authority used accurate procedures or not. 
However, accuracy had a positive impact on 
procedural fairness judgments and emotional 
responses when the authority was expected to be 
unbiased. A plausible explanation to the fi ndings 
of Tyler et al. (1985) and De Cremer (2004) 
is that people attach little value to procedural 
fairness rules such as voice and accuracy when 
they assume that these procedures are used 
strategically, rather than based on genuine 
intentions to be unbiased and fair (De Cremer, 
2004; but see Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, Lind, & 
Wilke, 2006).
How do these fi ndings relate to encounters 
with outgroup authorities? We propose that 
because outgroup members are generally ex-
pected to be biased, in the absence of concrete 
information to the contrary, people do not expect 
outgroup authorities to have genuine intentions 
to be fair. As a result, procedural fairness effects 
(e.g. effects of voice) should be relatively weak 
in encounters with outgroup authorities (Ståhl 
et al., 2004). However, this line of reasoning 
would also imply that when an outgroup author-
ity is expected not to be biased, people should 
be more inclined to react positively to fair pro-
cedures, as an absence of bias suggests that the 
authority has genuine intentions to be fair. For 
example, people should react positively to voice 
when the outgroup authority is expected to be 
unbiased, because they feel assured that their 
views will be considered. Based on this line of 
reasoning we hypothesize that the effect of voice 
on reactions to decisions made by an outgroup 
authority should be enhanced when the authority 
has a reputation of being unbiased rather than 
biased (Hypothesis 1). 
Aside from affecting the value of procedural 
fairness, we argue that expected bias should also 
infl uence to what extent reactions to outgroup 
authorities’ decisions are based on outcome 
favorability. Duck and Fielding (1999, 2003) 
suggested that because outgroup authorities are 
expected to be biased, people are particularly 
concerned about outcomes in such encounters 
to fi nd out whether or not the bias they expect 
will actually emerge. We propose here that ex-
pected bias not only affects the extent to which 
people attend to outcomes, but also how people 
interpret and respond to the outcomes received. 
Research on evaluations of adversary trial pro-
cedures has shown that particularly negative 
responses to unfavorable outcomes are found 
when information suggests that the judge has 
a personal relationship to the party favored by 
the decision (Lind & Lissak, 1985). Supposedly, 
this occurs because people suspect that the 
judge’s personal relationship may infl uence the 
decision. Subsequently, when the outcome turns 
out to favor the person with whom the authority 
had a personal relationship, people easily con-
clude that their prior expectations have been 
confi rmed. We argue here that, because outgroup 
members are generally expected to be biased in 
favor of members of their own group, reactions 
to decisions made by outgroup authorities are 
frequently the result of similar attributional 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
284
processes. Specifi cally, whenever a decision 
favors one of the authority’s ingroup members 
over an outgroup member, it is easy to attribute 
this to their common group membership. 
As a consequence, an unfavorable outcome that 
is seen to stem from bias may be perceived as 
unfair, and as a case of discrimination. 
In short, we propose that reactions to decisions 
are strongly infl uenced by outcome favorabil-
ity in encounters with outgroup authorities in 
part because outgroup members are expected to 
be biased. At the same time, this interpretation 
also implies that, when an outgroup authority is 
expected to be unbiased, the relative favorability 
of an outcome should have less infl uence on 
reactions to the outgroup authority’s decisions. 
After all, when bias is not expected, it should 
be less likely that the outcome is attributed to 
one’s group membership. 
To the best of our knowledge, no studies to 
date have directly investigated this possibility. 
However, previous research indicates that expec-
tations of bias affect allocation behavior toward the 
outgroup. Duck and Fielding (1999) found 
that the extent to which people expected an 
outgroup leader to be biased affected their own 
behavior toward the outgroup. Specifi cally, the 
more people expected the outgroup leader to be 
biased, the more they favored their own ingroup 
when allocating points in allocation matrices 
(see also Diehl, 1989, 1990; Ng, 1981). Duck and 
Fielding explained this fi nding by arguing that 
people compensated for anticipated ingroup 
disadvantage (cf. Moy & Ng, 1996). 
Indirect support for our line of reasoning can 
be derived from a recent study where people’s 
reactions to outgroup authorities’ decisions 
were examined as a function of their level of 
ingroup identification (Ståhl et al., 2006). 
Because high ingroup identifi ers differentiate 
between the ingroup and outgroup to a larger 
extent than do low identifi ers (Doosje, Ellemers, 
& Spears, 1995), it was argued that expectations 
of outgroup members as untrustworthy and 
biased should be particularly strong among high 
identifi ers. As a consequence, it was expected 
(and found) that reactions to unfavorable treat-
ment from an outgroup authority are particu-
larly negative among high ingroup identifi ers. 
Importantly, however, expectations of bias were 
assumed rather than directly examined in this 
study. As a result, it is yet unknown whether 
expectations of bias enhance the infl uence of 
outcome favorability on reactions to outgroup 
authorities’ decisions. In the present research we 
aim to examine this directly by experimentally 
manipulating whether an outgroup authority has 
a reputation of being biased or unbiased. Based 
on our line of reasoning and initial research, we 
predict that the effect of outcome favorability 
on reactions to decisions made by an outgroup 
authority is enhanced when the authority has a 
reputation of being biased rather than unbiased 
(Hypothesis 2).
We tested these hypotheses in two studies. 
In the fi rst study we aimed to obtain preliminary 
support for the hypotheses by asking people 
how they would react to an outgroup authority 
who tends to be biased (vs. unbiased) and who 
used fair (vs. unfair) procedures to provide a 
favorable (vs. unfavorable) outcome. The second 
study was intended to replicate and extend 
the fi ndings in a more self-involving setting where 
we also examined the mediating processes. In the 
fi rst study we focused on people’s evaluations of 
the outgroup authority following an allocation 
decision (e.g. Ståhl et al., 2004), and their 
willingness to accept the authority’s decision 
(e.g. Huo et al., 1996) under different conditions. 
In the second study we focused on actual inten-
tions to protest against the authority’s decision 
(e.g. Ståhl, Vermunt, & Ellemers, 2008; Vermunt, 
Wit, Van den Bos, & Lind, 1996). 
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design Altogether, 128 stu-
dents at the University of Skövde (97 females, 
31 males, mean age = 25.69 years) were ran-
domly assigned to conditions in a 2 (authority 
reputation: bias/no bias) × 2 (procedure: voice/ 
no voice) × 2 (outcome: favorable/unfavorable) 
factorial design. 
Procedure The materials were distributed to 
participants during regular classroom sessions. 
Participants read the scenario and responded 
285
Ståhl et al. reactions to outgroup authorities’ decisions
to the questions constituting the dependent 
variables and manipulation checks. Participants 
were asked to imagine the following scenario:
You are working in an organization. The organization 
consists of two departments, the Blue department 
and the Red department. You are a member of 
the Blue department. One day Robin Eriksson, a 
senior manager of the Red department, announces 
that the company has signed a contract with a 
new important client. This contract will yield an 
approximately equal amount of work for both the 
Blue department and the Red department. Now, the 
senior manager of the Red department announces, 
a person to take responsibility of the whole project 
needs to be appointed from either the Blue or the 
Red department. Getting this position would be a 
great career opportunity, and you would very much 
like to get the position. Robin Eriksson further sug-
gests that you or Kim Svensson, an employee from 
the Red department, should get this position. Which 
one of you will get the position will be decided later 
on by Robin Eriksson.  
After that, authority reputation was mani-
pulated. Participants in the bias and no-bias 
conditions read (manipulated information in 
italics):
From other employees at the Blue department, 
you’ve received information that Robin Eriksson 
often/never favors members of the Red department 
over members of the Blue department.
This was followed by the manipulation of 
procedure. Participants in the voice and no-
voice conditions read (manipulated information 
in italics): 
Before the fi nal decision is made, you and Kim 
Svensson are/are not given an opportunity to argue 
why you should get the position.
After that, the manipulation of outcome favor-
ability took place. Participants in the favorable 
and unfavorable conditions read (manipulated 
information in italics):
Two weeks later Robin Eriksson, the assistant man-
ager from the Red department, announces that 
you/Kim Svensson will get the position.
After that, all participants fi lled out the ques-
tions constituting the dependent variables and 
manipulation checks. Main dependent variables 
were participants’ evaluations of the authority 
and their willingness to accept the authority’s 
decision. We measured how the authority was 
evaluated by asking: ‘Do you respect the decision 
maker?’ (1 = absolutely not, 7 = absolutely) and ‘Do 
you trust the decision maker?’ (1 = absolutely not, 
7 = absolutely). Responses to these items were 
averaged to create a reliable measure of authority 
evaluations (r = .84, p < .001). To measure 
decision acceptance we asked: ‘To what extent 
are you willing to adhere to the decision?’ (1 = not 
at all, 7 = completely). To check the manipulation 
of bias we asked: ‘According to other employees 
at your department, does the senior manager 
from the Red department favor employees at his 
own department?’ (1 = yes, often, 2 = no, never). In 
order to check the manipulation of procedure 
two questions were asked: ‘To what extent do 
you agree with the statement that you and Kim 
Svensson got an opportunity to argue for your 
cause before the decision was made?’ (1 = not 
at all, 7 = completely), and ‘To what extent do 
you agree with the statement that you and Kim 
Svensson had no chance to argue for your cause 
before the decision was made?’ (1 = not at all, 
7 = completely). The second item was reversed after 
which the responses to the two items (r = .82, 
p < .001) were averaged to create a procedure 
check. Finally, to check the manipulation of 
outcome favorability, two questions were asked: 
‘To what extent do you agree with the statement 
that you got the responsibility for the new 
client?’ (1 = not at all, 7 = completely), and ‘To 
what extent do you agree with the statement that 
Kim Svensson got the responsibility for the new 
client?’ (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). The second 
item was reversed, after which the responses to 
the two items (r = .97, p < .001) were averaged 
to create an outcome check.
Results
Manipulation checks A vast majority (117 out 
of 128; χ2(1) = 87.78, p < .001) of participants 
correctly responded to the authority reputation 
manipulation check. Because excluding the 11 
participants who failed to correctly respond 
to this question yielded essentially the same 
results on the dependent variables, we decided 
to include them in the analyses. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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For all subsequent analyses we performed 
a 2 (authority reputation: bias/no bias) × 2 
(procedure: voice/no voice) × 2 (outcome: 
favorable/unfavorable) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Participants in the voice condition 
agreed more with the statement that they had 
received an opportunity to argue for their 
cause (M = 5.94, SD = 1.45), than participants 
in the no-voice condition (M = 1.55, SD = 1.15) 
(F(1, 120) = 352.81, p < .001, partial η2 = .75). 
Furthermore, participants in the favorable 
condition agreed more with the statement 
that they had received the new position 
(M = 6.59, SD = 1.18), than participants in the 
unfavorable condition (M = 1.15, SD = 0.59) 
(F(1, 120) = 1044.56, p < .001, partial η2 = .90). 
No other effects were found. Thus, we conclude 
that all manipulations had been perceived as 
intended.
Authority evaluations Participants evaluated the 
authority more positively following a favorable 
outcome (M = 5.05, SD = 1.68), than following 
an unfavorable outcome (M = 3.74, SD = 1.75) 
(F(1, 120) = 19.99, p < .001, partial η2 = .14). 
In addition, the authority was evaluated more 
positively following a voice procedure (M = 4.89, 
SD = 1.69), than following a no-voice procedure 
(M = 3.93, SD = 1.85) (F(1, 120) = 11.05, p < .005, 
partial η2 = .08). More importantly, the predicted 
authority reputation by outcome interaction 
also was found (F(1, 120) = 3.71, p < .06, partial 
η2 = .03). As expected, participants in the bias 
condition evaluated the authority more posi-
tively following a favorable outcome (M = 5.13, 
SD = 1.61) than following an unfavorable outcome 
(M = 3.27, SD = 1.68) (F(1, 120) = 20.49, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .15). The outcome effect was only 
marginally signifi cant in the no-bias condition 
(Favorable, M = 4.97, SD = 1.76; Unfavorable, 
M = 4.23, SD = 1.71) (F(1, 120) = 3.39, p < .07, 
partial η2 = .03). Thus, support was found for 
Hypothesis 2. No other effects were signifi cant, 
including the authority reputation by procedure 
interaction relevant for Hypothesis 1. Instead, 
as indicated by the signifi cant main effect, voice 
positively affected evaluations of the author-
ity regardless of whether the authority had a 
reputation of being biased or not. We will return 
to this in the discussion. 
Decision acceptance Participants were more 
willing to accept a favorable outcome (M = 6.46, 
SD = 1.03), than an unfavorable outcome 
(M = 6.02; SD = 1.34) (F(1, 120) = 4.47, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .04). Overall, the procedure did 
not infl uence participants’ actual acceptance 
of the decision (F(1, 120) = .33, p = .57, partial 
η2 = .003). However, in line with Hypothesis 1, the 
authority reputation by procedure interaction 
was signifi cant (F(1, 120) = 7.12, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .06). As predicted, participants in the no-
bias condition were more willing to accept the 
decision following a voice procedure (M = 6.61, 
SD = 0.67) than following a no-voice procedure 
(M = 5.94, SD = 1.52) (F(1, 120) = 5.16, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .04). By contrast, there was no sig-
nifi cant effect of voice in the bias condition 
(Voice, M = 6.0, SD = 1.44; No voice, M = 6.44, 
SD = 0.88) (F(1, 120) = 2.19, p = .14, partial 
η2 = .02).
Notably, although the authority reputation 
by outcome interaction was not significant 
(F(1, 120) = .33, p = .57, partial η2 = .003), 
simple effect analyses indicated that the main 
effect of outcome found on decision acceptance 
was primarily attributable to reactions in the 
bias condition (F(1, 120) = 3.62, p < .06, partial 
η2 = .03), rather than in the no-bias condition 
(F(1, 120) = 1.24, p = .27, partial η2 = .01). Thus, 
some support was obtained also for Hypothesis 2. 
We will return to this issue in the discussion. 
Discussion
We have argued here that procedural fairness 
effects are relatively weak in encounters with 
outgroup authorities in part because outgroup 
members are generally expected to be biased. 
As a result, it was proposed that it should be 
possible to enhance procedural fairness effects 
by providing information suggesting that the 
outgroup authority is not biased. This prediction 
received initial support from this study which 
demonstrated that acceptance of the authority’s 
decision was positively affected by voice when the 
authority had a reputation of being unbiased, but 
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not when reputation suggested bias. However, 
this prediction was not supported by people’s 
evaluations of the authority, as voice positively 
affected authority evaluations irrespective of 
the authority’s reputation. 
We also proposed that reactions to outgroup 
authorities’ decisions are often based on the 
favorability of the outcome because outgroup 
authorities are expected to be biased. As a 
consequence, it was proposed that it should be 
possible to attenuate outcome favorability effects 
by providing information suggesting that the 
authority is unbiased. The results of this study 
offer some initial support for this argument 
as well. As expected, when the authority had a 
reputation of being biased, the favorability of 
the outcome had a stronger effect on people’s 
evaluations of the authority than when the 
authority had a reputation of being unbiased. 
For actual acceptance of the authority’s deci-
sion, however, only the main effect of outcome 
favorability reached statistical signifi cance. As 
expected, the infl uence of outcome favorability 
on decision acceptance was somewhat stronger 
when the authority had a reputation of being 
biased (vs. unbiased). However, the moderat-
ing role of authority reputation was not strong 
enough to yield an interaction. In sum, support 
for our fi rst hypothesis was found on decision 
acceptance, whereas some support for our second 
hypothesis was found primarily on evaluations 
of the authority. 
Although not anticipated, the different pat-
terns observed for authority evaluations and 
decision acceptance seem fairly reasonable in 
retrospect. Procedural fairness effects are gen-
erally particularly strong on evaluations of 
authorities, groups and institutions rather than 
on reactions to specifi c decisions (Tyler & Lind, 
1992). According to the relational model, this is 
because procedures convey information about 
the values of the group and its representatives 
(e.g. authorities). This implies that it should be 
relatively diffi cult to reduce effects of procedural 
fairness on evaluations of an authority. By 
contrast, previous research has demonstrated 
that decision acceptance is more closely linked 
to outcome favorability than other measures of 
legitimacy (Ståhl et al., 2004; Tyler, 1997). This 
implies that it should be particularly diffi cult to 
reduce the infl uence of outcome favorability on 
measures of decision acceptance. 
Viewed in this light, the results reported here 
seem relatively straightforward. Irrespective of 
the authority’s reputation, procedural fairness 
effects were obtained on the measure most 
closely connected to procedural fairness (author-
ity evaluations). Thus, authority reputation 
did not have enough impact to moderate the 
robust link between procedural fairness and 
authority evaluations. In line with our first 
hypothesis, however, authority reputation did 
moderate the effect of procedural fairness 
on decision acceptance, a measure less closely 
connected to procedural fairness. By contrast, 
outcome favorability effects were obtained on 
the measure most closely linked to outcome 
favorability (decision acceptance) irrespective of 
the authority’s reputation. In other words, our 
manipulation of authority reputation did not 
have enough impact to moderate the strong 
link between outcome favorability and decision 
acceptance. However, in line with our second 
hypothesis, authority reputation did moderate 
the infl uence of outcome favorability on evalu-
ations of the authority, a measure less closely 
connected to outcome favorability. 
The fi ndings of this study are important, as 
they provide novel insights into the psychology 
of reactions to outgroup authorities’ decisions, 
and ultimately about how reactions to such 
encounters can be altered. However, before 
strong conclusions can be drawn based on these 
fi ndings it is important to replicate them. This 
is particularly important here as some of the 
results required post hoc interpretation. Another 
reason why an additional study seems critical is 
that the data in the fi rst study were obtained by 
assessing participants anticipated responses. One 
may therefore wonder whether similar results can 
be found when people are actually subjected to 
the authority whose decision they are asked to 
respond to. Notably, previous research suggests 
that people tend to overestimate the infl uence 
of outcome favorability when asked how they 
would react to a decision as compared to how 
they actually do react to decisions (Tyler, Huo, & 
Lind, 1999). It is therefore possible that the 
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effects of outcome favorability obtained here 
were somewhat infl ated. If this is the case, this 
could also help explain why authority reputa-
tion only slightly moderated the effect of out-
come favorability on actual acceptance of the 
authority’s decision in the present study. In 
the second study we address these issues as we 
examine the effects of authority reputation, 
procedural fairness and outcome favorability on 
responses to an outgroup authority’s decisions 
in a more self-involving and consequential set-
ting. As participants actually experience the 
manipulations in this study, we also decided to 
use a measure of their willingness to accept the 
decision that is more closely related to actual 
behavior—individual intentions to protest (Ståhl 
et al., 2008; Vermunt et al., 1996).
Experiment 2
Aside from providing a conceptual replication 
examining the responses of people who are actu-
ally immersed in the decision situation, we had 
an additional aim with our second study. In 
order to more fully understand the psychological 
processes at work, we wanted to investigate po-
tential mediators for each of the two predicted 
effects. 
In the fi rst study we established that expected 
bias can moderate the effect of voice on responses 
to an outgroup authority’s decisions. One of 
the aims of the second study was therefore to 
examine a potential mediator of this effect. At 
the core of our line of reasoning is the idea that 
expectations of bias affect the perceived value 
of procedural fairness rules (cf. De Cremer, 
2004). When the authority is expected to be 
biased, the application of fair procedures 
should be perceived as relatively superfi cial and 
strategic, rather than based on sincere inten-
tions to be fair. As a result, people should not 
be particularly satisfi ed with the way they are 
treated, even though procedures are formally in 
line with procedural fairness rules. For example, 
when voice is provided by a presumably biased 
authority, people should not be confi dent that 
the authority will actually consider their views. 
As a result, voice should have relatively little 
impact on how satisfi ed people are with the way 
they are treated by the authority. In situations 
where people do not expect bias, however, they 
should be more willing to rely on the authority’s 
intentions, and to appreciate the value of an 
opportunity to voice their opinion. 
In short, we expect that an outgroup author-
ity’s reputation (bias vs. no bias) and the fairness 
of the procedures used (e.g. voice vs. no voice) 
should interactively shape people’s satisfaction 
with the treatment they receive. Furthermore, 
when controlling for differences in treatment 
satisfaction, we expect that authority reputation 
no longer should moderate the effect of pro-
cedural fairness on behavioral intentions fol-
lowing an outgroup authority’s decision. In other 
words, when the authority has a reputation of 
being unbiased (vs. biased), people should be 
satisfi ed with their treatment when provided 
with an opportunity to voice their opinion, and 
therefore be more reluctant to protest. Thus, the 
extent to which people are satisfi ed with the 
treatment received should mediate the inter-
action between authority reputation and pro-
cedural fairness on protest intentions.
We also wanted to examine a potential medi-
ator of the predicted interaction between 
authority reputation and outcome favorabil-
ity on behavioral intentions following an out-
group authority’s decision. We have argued 
here that, because outgroup members are 
generally expected to be biased, people easily 
attribute unfavorable decisions made by an 
outgroup authority to their group membership 
and hence may perceive unfavorable outcomes 
as examples of discrimination. This line of 
reasoning implies that outcome favorability 
should generally infl uence perceived outcome 
fairness in encounters with outgroup authorities. 
Indeed, previous research has demonstrated 
that outcome favorability does shape outcome 
fairness judgments in encounters with an 
outgroup authority (Duck & Fielding, 2003). 
However, if our line of reasoning is accurate, 
outcome favorability should affect perceived 
outcome fairness particularly when the outgroup 
authority has a reputation of being biased rather 
than unbiased. Furthermore, when controlling 
for differences in perceived outcome fairness, we 
would expect that authority reputation no longer 
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should moderate the infl uence of outcome 
favorability on intentions to protest against the 
outgroup authority’s decision. In other words, 
when the authority has a reputation of being 
biased (vs. unbiased), people should perceive 
unfavorable outcomes as unfair, resulting in 
stronger intentions to protest. Thus, we predict 
that perceived outcome fairness should mediate 
the interaction between authority reputation and 
outcome favorability on intentions to protest.
To test these arguments we carried out an 
additional study in which we once again mani-
pulated the outgroup authority’s reputation 
(bias vs. no bias), procedure (voice vs. no voice) 
and the outcome (favorable vs. unfavorable). 
Main dependent variables were participants’ 
intentions to protest against the decision, as well 
as the proposed mediators: treatment satisfaction 
and outcome fairness judgments. 
Method
Participants and design Altogether, 128 stu-
dents at the University of Skövde (97 females, 
31 males,2 mean age = 24.31 years) participated 
before or after participating in another unrelated 
study. Participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions in a 2 (authority reputation: bias/ 
no bias) × 2 (procedure: voice/no voice) × 2 
(outcome: favorable/unfavorable) factorial 
design. All participants received a movie-ticket 
for their time in the laboratory. 
Procedure Upon arrival at the laboratory all 
participants were led to separate cubicles. In 
each cubicle participants found a computer with 
a computer screen, a keyboard and a computer 
mouse. The computers were used to present 
the stimulus information as well as to collect 
the data. The experiment was introduced as 
a study on how individual cognitive strategies 
affect task performance. Participants then 
took part in the experiment and answered the 
questions constituting the dependent variables 
and manipulation checks.
In the fi rst part of the instructions participants 
were informed that because the study focused 
on effects of individual cognitive strategies, the 
fi rst aim was to measure these individual char-
acteristics. After that, participants fi lled out a 
bogus Mental Association Style Test (e.g. Van 
Leeuwen, 2001). Then, participants received 
bogus feedback about their association style. 
Specifi cally, participants were informed that they 
had a holistic association style (as opposed to 
a detail-focused association style). Participants 
were then informed that the rest of the study 
focused on performance on specific tasks. 
Furthermore, participants were informed that, 
for the rest of the study, they participated along 
with two other persons. It was further noted that 
one of them (the participant included) would be 
appointed to the position of supervisor, referred 
to as position A. The two remaining participants, 
it was announced, would be appointed to the 
positions of workers, referred to as positions B 
and C. After that, positions were assigned. 
Participants were all appointed to position B. 
Participants were informed that the persons 
appointed to positions B (the participant) and 
C were given these positions because they had 
not had previous experience with similar studies, 
and because they differed in their association 
styles. It was once again pointed out that B 
(the participant) had a holistic association 
style, whereas C had a detail-focused association 
style. Finally, participants were informed that 
the person appointed to position A was given 
this position because of this person’s previous 
experience with similar studies (cf. Van den 
Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). 
After that participants were informed that they 
would work on a certain task, and that at the 
end of the experiment, a bonus prize would 
be given to one of the workers (i.e. B or C). 
Participants were informed that the person 
appointed to position A (i.e. the supervisor 
position) would decide who should get the 
bonus prize. The task was then explained to 
the participants. The task was the same used in 
the experimental paradigm developed by Van 
den Bos and his colleagues (e.g. Van den Bos, 
Lind, Vermunt & Wilke, 1997). A fi gure con-
sisting of 36 squares with different patterns 
appears on the screen. The participants’ task 
is to count the number of squares within the 
fi gure that has a certain pattern. As soon as the 
correct number of squares has been indicated, 
a new fi gure as well as a new pattern to identify 
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appears on the screen. Participants work on the 
task in a practice round for 2 minutes followed 
by a work round of 10 minutes. The number 
of tasks solved in the work-round is calculated 
and displayed on the screen throughout the 
work-round.
Then it was communicated that, because A 
would be the supervisor, it might be of interest 
to know a little bit about A, and how A had been 
perceived by participants in previous studies. 
Participants were then informed that A had a 
detail-focused association style, i.e. similar to 
person C but different from B (the participant). 
After that, authority reputation was manipulated. 
Participants received bogus results from a 
survey allegedly fi lled out by people who had 
participated with A in a previous study. In the 
bias condition, participants were informed that 
A had been rated as biased by participants with 
a holistic association style (i.e. by participants 
who belonged to the supervisor’s outgroup), 
and as unbiased by participants with a detail-
focused association style (i.e. by participants 
from the supervisor’s ingroup). Participants 
in the no-bias condition were informed that 
A had consistently been rated as unbiased by 
participants with a detail-focused association 
style as well as by participants with a holistic 
association style. 
Following the work round, participants were 
reminded of how many tasks they had completed. 
After that, all participants were informed that 
C performed an equivalent number of tasks. 
Then the procedure manipulation took place. 
Participants in the voice condition received 
a message from A informing them that A was 
interested in the participant’s opinion concerning 
who should get the bonus prize. Participants in 
the voice condition then got to indicate their 
opinion concerning who should get the bonus 
prize. Participants in the no-voice condition 
received a message from A informing them 
that A was not interested in the participant’s 
opinion concerning who should get the bonus 
prize. Therefore, it was communicated, the 
participant would not get an opportunity to voice 
his/her opinion on this matter (cf. Van den Bos, 
1999). After that the favorability of the outcome 
was manipulated. Participants in the favorable 
condition were informed that B would receive 
the bonus prize. Participants in the unfavor-
able condition were informed that C would re-
ceive the bonus prize. 
All participants then answered the questions 
constituting the dependent variables and 
manipulation checks. All items were measured 
on 7-point Likert scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
much). The main dependent variable was 
participants’ individual intentions to protest. In 
addition, we also measured treatment satisfaction 
and outcome fairness judgments. To measure 
intentions to protest two questions were asked: 
‘Suppose that you could criticize person A; 
to what extent would you then do so?’ and 
‘Suppose that you could protest against person 
A; to what extent would you then do so?’. These 
items were averaged to create a reliable protest 
intentions scale (r = .78, p < .001). To measure 
treatment satisfaction three questions were 
asked: ‘How satisfi ed are you with the way you 
were treated?’, ‘How dissatisfi ed are you with the 
way you were treated?’, and ‘How unhappy are 
you with the way you were treated?’. The last two 
items were reversed after which the three items 
were averaged to create a reliable treatment 
satisfaction scale (α = .83). To measure outcome 
fairness judgments two questions were asked: 
‘How fair was person A’s decision about who 
should get the bonus prize?’ and ‘How correct 
was person A’s decision about who should get 
the bonus prize?’. These items were averaged 
to create a reliable outcome fairness judgment 
scale (r = .69, p < .001).3 
To check the manipulation of authority repu-
tation we asked: ‘To what extent do you agree 
with the statement that person A has shown 
unbiased behavior in the past?’. Two questions 
were asked to check the manipulation of pro-
cedure: ‘To what extent do you agree with the 
statement that you received an opportunity to 
voice your opinion about who should get the 
bonus prize?’ and ‘To what extent do you agree 
with the statement that you did not receive an 
opportunity to voice your opinion about who 
should get the bonus prize?’. After reversing the 
second item, these items were averaged to create 
a reliable procedure check (r = .91, p < .001). 
Finally, two questions were asked to check the 
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manipulation of outcome: ‘To what extent do 
you agree with the statement that you will get 
the bonus prize?’ and ‘To what extent do you 
agree with the statement that person C will get 
the bonus prize?’. After reversing the second 
item, these items were averaged to create a reli-
able outcome check (r = .85, p < .001).
Results
All measures were analyzed by means of 2 
(authority reputation: bias/no bias) × 2 (pro-
cedure: voice/no voice) × 2 (outcome: favorable/
unfavorable) ANOVAs. 
Manipulation checks Participants in the no-
bias condition reported a stronger agreement 
with the statement that the authority had 
demonstrated unbiased behavior in the past 
(M = 4.47, SD = 1.98) than participants in 
the bias condition (M = 3.03, SD = 1.81) 
(F(1, 120) = 18.30, p < .001, partial η2 = .13). 
No other effects were found on this measure. 
Most notably, the effectiveness of the authority 
reputation manipulation did not depend on the 
favorability of the outcome, as demonstrated by 
the fact that the authority reputation by outcome 
interaction was nonexistent (F(1, 120) = .04, 
p = .85, partial η2 = .00). Participants in the voice 
condition agreed to a larger extent that they 
had received voice (M = 5.63, SD = 1.88), than 
participants in the no-voice condition (M = 1.78, 
SD = 1.58) (F(1, 120) = 168.65, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .58). Although we also found a main effect 
of authority reputation (F(1, 120) = 6.00, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .05), and a three-way interaction 
(F(1, 120) = 7.36, p < .01, partial η2 = .06), 
post hoc tests (Tukey) indicated that the only 
signifi cant differences were found between all 
the voice conditions on the one hand, and all the 
no-voice conditions on the other (p < .05). Based 
on the robust main effect of procedure (partial 
η2 = .58) and the fact that post hoc tests revealed 
no signifi cant differences between conditions 
other than the ones intended, we think it is 
reasonable to conclude that the procedure 
manipulation was perceived as intended. Finally, 
participants in the favorable condition agreed 
more with the statement that they would get the 
bonus (M = 6.05, SD = 1.24), than participants in 
the unfavorable condition (M = 1.40, SD = 0.94) 
(F(1, 120) = 562.60, p < .001, partial η2 = .82). 
No other effects were found on this measure. 
Thus we conclude that the manipulations were 
perceived as intended.
Protest intentions A main effect of procedure 
was found (F(1, 120) = 7.50, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .06). More importantly, however, this effect 
was qualifi ed by a signifi cant authority reputation 
by procedure interaction (F(1, 120) = 4.19, 
p < .05, partial η2 = .03). As predicted, par-
ticipants in the no-bias condition reported 
stronger protest intentions when they did not 
receive voice (M = 4.36, SD = 1.73), than when 
they did receive voice (M = 2.95, SD = 1.38) 
(F(1, 120) = 11.45, p < .001, partial η2 = .09). This 
difference was not found in the bias condition 
(No voice, M = 3.83, SD = 1.83; Voice, M = 3.63, 
SD = 1.73) (F(1, 120) = .24, p = .63, partial 
η2 = 002). Thus, support was found for our fi rst 
hypothesis. Relevant for our second hypothesis, 
a marginally signifi cant authority reputation by 
outcome interaction also was found (F(1, 120) 
= 2.80, p < .10, partial η2 = .02). As expected, 
participants in the bias condition reported 
stronger protest intentions when the outcome 
was unfavorable (M = 4.09, SD = 1.77) than when 
the outcome was favorable (M = 3.36, SD = 1.71) 
(F(1, 120) = 3.12, p = .08, partial η2 = .03). This 
difference was not found in the no-bias condition 
(Unfavorable, M = 3.53, SD = 1.78; Favorable, 
M = 3.78, SD = 1.64) (F(1, 120) = .36, p = .55, 
partial η2 = .003). Thus, some support was found 
also for our second hypothesis. No other effects 
were found.
Treatment satisfaction Participants were 
more satisfi ed with their treatment following a 
favorable outcome (M = 5.52, SD = 1.42) than 
following an unfavorable outcome (M = 4.33, 
SD = 1.39) (F(1, 120) = 25.26, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .17). A main effect of procedure also was 
found (F(1, 120) = 7.58, p < .01, partial η2 = .06). 
Importantly, however, the procedure effect was 
qualifi ed by the predicted authority reputation by 
procedure interaction (F(1, 120) = 4.40, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .04). As expected, participants in the 
no-bias condition were more satisfi ed following 
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a voice procedure (M = 5.59, SD = 1.32) than 
following a no-voice procedure (M = 4.44, 
SD = 1.42) (F(1, 120) = 11.77, p < .005, partial 
η2 = .09). This difference was not found in the 
bias condition (Voice, M = 4.91, SD = 1.69; No 
voice, M = 4.75, SD = 1.46) (F (1, 120) = .21, 
p = .64, partial η2 = .002). No other effects 
were found. 
Outcome fairness judgments Only an authority 
reputation by outcome interaction was found on 
this measure (F(1, 120) = 4.15, p < .05, partial 
η2 = .03). As predicted, perceived outcome 
fairness was higher in the bias condition following 
a favorable outcome (M = 4.45, SD = 1.54) than 
following an unfavorable outcome (M = 3.81, 
SD = 1.09) (F(1, 120) = 3.11, p = .08, partial 
η2 = .03). This difference was not observed in 
the no-bias condition (Favorable, M = 3.89, 
SD = 1.46; Unfavorable, M = 4.30, SD = 1.65) 
(F(1, 120) = 1.25, p = .27, partial η2 = .01).4 
Mediation analyses Two different mediating 
processes were expected. First, satisfaction 
with the treatment received was expected to 
mediate the authority reputation by procedure 
interaction found on participants’ protest 
intentions. Second, perceived outcome fairness 
was expected to mediate the marginal authority 
reputation by outcome interaction found on 
participants’ protest intentions. To test these 
predictions we performed a series of regression 
analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
The results of the regression analyses testing 
the fi rst predicted mediation are depicted in 
Figure 1. To test the fi rst predicted mediation, 
we started by regressing the expected mediator 
(treatment satisfaction) on the three independent 
variables (contrast coded –1 and 1) as well as all 
the interaction terms (including the three-way 
interaction). Confi rming previous ANOVAs, the 
authority reputation by procedure interaction 
term predicted treatment satisfaction (β = .17, 
p < .05). In the second step we regressed the 
dependent variable (intentions to protest) on the 
independent variables and all interaction terms. 
Once again confi rming ANOVAs, intentions to 
protest were predicted by the authority repu-
tation by procedure interaction term (β = –.18, 
p < .05). After that, protest intentions were 
again regressed on the independent variables 
and interaction terms, but this time treatment 
satisfaction was included in the equation. As 
expected, treatment satisfaction signifi cantly 
predicted intentions to protest (β = –.54, 
p < .001). Furthermore, when treatment satis-
faction was included in the analysis, the authority 
reputation by procedure interaction term no 
longer predicted protest intentions (β = –.09, 
p = .26). The mediating role of treatment 
satisfaction was further supported by a Sobel 
test, Z = –1.98, p < .025 (one-tailed).
We then performed an equivalent set of re-
gression analyses to test the second predicted 
mediating process: that outcome fairness should 
mediate the interaction between authority 
Figure 1. The indirect effect of the authority reputation by procedure interaction on protest intentions 
through treatment satisfaction. 
** p < .001; * p < .05.
293
Ståhl et al. reactions to outgroup authorities’ decisions
reputation and outcome on protest intentions. 
The results of the regression analyses testing this 
mediation are depicted in Figure 2. Confi rming 
previous ANOVAs, the authority reputation by 
outcome interaction term predicted outcome 
fairness (β = –.18, p < .05). Regressing intentions 
to protest on all independent variables and 
interaction terms confi rmed previous ANOVAs 
showing that the authority reputation by outcome 
interaction term served as a marginally signifi cant 
predictor (β = .14, p < .10). Finally, including 
outcome fairness in the equation confi rmed 
that outcome fairness predicted intentions 
to protest (β = –.33, p < .001). Furthermore, 
when outcome fairness was included in the 
analysis, the authority reputation by outcome 
interaction term no longer predicted protest 
intentions (β = .08, p = .32). Our contention that 
outcome fairness acts as a (partial) mediator of 
the authority reputation by outcome interaction 
was further supported by a Sobel test, Z = 1.83, 
p < .05 (one-tailed).5
General discussion
The research reported here was instigated to 
examine psychological processes contributing 
to reactions to allocation decisions made by 
members of an outgroup. Based on previous 
research on intergroup perception, we suggested 
that an important reason for the weak infl uence 
of procedural fairness on reactions to out-
group authorities’ decisions is that people tend 
to perceive outgroup members as relatively 
untrustworthy, and expect them to be biased 
in favor of members of their own group. Based 
on this line of reasoning, we wanted to inves-
tigate whether it is possible to enhance the 
impact of procedural fairness on reactions to 
an outgroup authority’s decisions by provid-
ing information that the authority is unbiased. 
This hypothesis was based on research indicat-
ing that the impact of procedural fairness 
(i.e. accuracy) is attenuated when the authority 
is expected to be biased (De Cremer, 2004), and 
studies suggesting that positive effects of voice 
disappear when people think that the authority 
will not truly consider their views (Tyler et al., 
1985). Applying these results to encounters with 
outgroup authorities, we argued that pervasive 
expectations of outgroup members as biased 
might in part explain why procedural fairness 
typically seems less relevant as a determinant 
of people’s reactions to outgroup authorities’ 
decisions (e.g. Ståhl et al., 2004, 2006). 
The results of both our studies supported this 
idea. In the fi rst study, the fairness of the pro-
cedure (i.e. voice) had no effect on decision 
acceptance when the authority was expected 
to be biased, while voice had a substantial and 
positive effect on decision acceptance when the 
authority was expected to be unbiased. A similar 
pattern was obtained on participants’ protest 
intentions in the second study. Specifi cally, pro-
test intentions were unaffected by voice when 
the authority was expected to be biased, while 
Figure 2. The indirect effect of the authority reputation by outcome interaction on protest intentions through 
outcome fairness.
** p < .001; * p < .05; † p < .10.
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protest intentions were weaker following a voice 
(vs. no voice) procedure when the authority was 
expected to be unbiased. The present research 
is thereby the fi rst to show that the way people 
respond to the procedural aspects of decisions 
made by an outgroup authority depends on 
the extent to which they expect this authority 
to be biased. 
Additional mediation analyses of the second 
study support the contention that the effect is 
driven by the perceived value of procedural 
fairness. Specifically, our second study sug-
gests that authority reputation and procedural 
fairness interactively shape how satisfi ed people 
are with the way they are treated, such that 
satisfaction is highest when an authority with 
a reputation of being unbiased uses a fair allo-
cation procedure (i.e. voice). Our fi ndings 
thus indicate that people can react to decisions 
made by outgroup authorities in ways similar 
to how they typically react in encounters with 
ingroup authorities, provided that the author-
ity is expected to be unbiased. When this is the 
case, protest intentions are strongly infl uenced 
by procedural fairness. 
A relevant question is exactly why the value 
of voice differs as a function of the authority’s 
reputation. From an instrumental perspective it 
seems plausible that the authority’s reputation 
affects perceptions of process control (Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975). It might very well be that people 
think that they are unable to infl uence the 
decision by means of voice when the authority 
is biased against them. As a result, receiving or 
not receiving an opportunity to voice may be 
of little consequence. From a relational per-
spective, however, it would be argued that the 
authority’s reputation moderates the level of 
respect communicated by a voice procedure. 
According to this view, an opportunity to voice 
does not indicate that one is respected by 
the authority if the authority is not thought 
to really consider what one has to say (Tyler 
et al., 1985). We suspect that both mechanisms 
may contribute to why an outgroup authority’s 
reputation moderates the infl uence of voice, 
although this is of course an empirical question. 
For the time being, however, we conclude that 
an outgroup authority’s reputation moderates 
the perceived value of voice and thereby the im-
pact of voice on people’s willingness to accept 
the authority’s decisions. 
An additional aim of the present research 
was to examine whether effects of outcome 
favorability are moderated by expected bias in 
encounters with an outgroup authority. In line 
with previous theorizing (Duck & Fielding, 
1999, 2003) we argued that when people expect 
the authority to be biased, they are particularly 
prone to pay attention and react to the favorability 
of the outcome to fi nd out whether or not these 
expectations are confi rmed. The two studies 
reported here provided some support for this 
line of reasoning by demonstrating that outcome 
favorability affects reactions to an outgroup 
authority’s decision when the authority has a 
reputation of being biased. At the same time, 
our fi ndings also extend previous research by 
showing that outcome favorability may be less 
important as a determinant of responses to deci-
sions made by an outgroup authority when the 
authority has a reputation of being unbiased. 
In the fi rst study, outcome favorability affected 
participants’ evaluations of the authority pri-
marily when information indicated that the 
authority was biased. However, it should be 
noted that outcome favorability influenced 
actual acceptance of the authority’s decision 
irrespective of the authority’s reputation, 
although the infl uence was somewhat weaker 
when bias was not expected. We believe these 
inconsistencies are in part due to the fact that 
decision acceptance is more closely linked to 
instrumental concerns than other measures of 
legitimacy (Tyler, 1997). However, they are most 
likely attributable to the specifi c methodology 
used in the fi rst study as well. Research has 
shown that when asked how they would react 
to decisions (as in the fi rst study), people tend 
to overestimate the infl uence of outcome favor-
ability, as compared to how they actually do react 
to decisions (Tyler et al., 1999). Indeed, in our 
second study, where people reacted to an actual 
experience of the same manipulations, the 
effects of outcome favorability were generally 
less pronounced. More importantly, authority 
reputation moderated the effect of outcome 
favorability on intentions to protest against the 
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outgroup authority’s decision. In line with our 
second hypothesis, participants’ intentions to 
protest against the outgroup authority’s decision 
were affected by the favorability of the outcome, 
but only when the authority had a reputation of 
being biased. When the authority had a repu-
tation of being biased, intentions to protest 
against the decision were stronger following an 
unfavorable outcome than following a favorable 
outcome. By contrast, when the authority had 
a reputation of being unbiased, protest inten-
tions were unaffected by the favorability of the 
outcome. 
The second study provided additional insight 
into the psychological processes driving this 
effect. Previous research has shown that out-
come favorability shapes fairness judgments in 
encounters with outgroup authorities (Duck & 
Fielding, 2003), an effect that has been inter-
preted as a reaction to perceptions of bias. 
Building on this line of reasoning, we proposed 
and demonstrated that perceptions of outcome 
fairness mediate the interaction effect between 
authority reputation and outcome favorability 
on protest intentions following an outgroup 
authority’s decision. An interesting implication 
of these fi ndings is that reactions to outgroup 
authorities’ decisions, that on the surface appear 
to be driven solely by self-interest, seem to be 
largely driven by fairness concerns. Specifi cally, 
our fi ndings suggest that protest intentions 
following an outgroup authority’s decision are 
guided by fairness concerns. However, unless 
information clearly indicates that the authority is 
unbiased, outgroup authorities will be expected 
to favor their own group members. As a result, 
when bias is expected, fairness judgments as 
well as protest intentions will be infl uenced by 
the favorability of the outcome. Expressed dif-
ferently, our fi ndings suggest that people respond 
to the favorability of outcomes in encounters 
with outgroup authorities that are expected 
to be biased, but that they do so in part out of 
concerns for fairness. 
Although we think that the fi ndings reported 
here provide relatively strong evidence for the 
role of expected bias, and are important as they 
are the fi rst to directly point to the relevance of 
bias expectations in encounters with outgroup 
authorities, the studies also have some limitations 
that need to be addressed. First, although we 
observed the predicted mean pattern, the author-
ity reputation by outcome interaction relevant for 
our second hypothesis was marginally signifi cant 
in these two studies. This was obviously somewhat 
disappointing, and also warrants some caution 
in our conclusions. At the same time, however, 
we think the fact that the pattern was in line 
with our prediction across two studies in which 
different methodologies were used, suggests 
that the fi ndings are reliable. 
A second point to address is the fact that par-
ticipants in these studies were given explicit 
information about the authority’s reputation of 
being biased (vs. unbiased). This provided a clear 
manipulation of expected bias, which was suitable 
here, as our main objective was to demonstrate 
the causal role of expected bias in reactions to 
outgroup members’ decisions. However, one 
might wonder about the boundary conditions 
for effects of expected bias. For example, would 
mere categorization of the authority as an out-
group member, with accompanying implicit 
expectations of bias (e.g. Duck & Fielding, 
1999), be enough to obtain similar effects? Now 
that the effects of expected bias on reactions 
to outgroup authorities’ decisions have been 
demonstrated, we think this would be a fruitful 
direction for future research.
Because the present research exclusively 
examined the role of authority reputation in 
reactions to decisions made by an outgroup 
authority, one may wonder whether a reputation 
of bias would initiate similar processes in 
interactions with an ingroup authority. We sus-
pect that there may be situations where processes 
rather similar to the ones observed in the pre-
sent research do operate in a pure intragroup 
context. For example, a schoolteacher could 
have a reputation of favoring a particular student 
over other students in the class, as illustrated 
by the expression ‘Teacher’s pet’. Notably, this 
type of bias is based on personal characteristics 
rather than group membership. Nevertheless, 
we suspect that the consequences of such a 
reputation for how people evaluate decisions 
may be quite similar as when an outgroup 
authority has a reputation of bias based on 
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group membership. Voice opportunities may be 
perceived as superfi cial and outcomes favoring 
a ‘teacher’s pet’ may be perceived as unfair.
But how would people react to an ingroup 
authority with a reputation of group-based bias? 
In such cases we suspect that reactions would be 
rather different from the ones observed in the 
present research. The main reason for this is that 
an ingroup authority with a reputation of group-
based bias should raise very different concerns 
than a biased outgroup authority. Rather than 
expecting to be discriminated against, con-
cerns would center around the possibility that 
oneself might be favored at the expense of 
outgroup members. What consequences could 
such concerns have for how people react to an 
ingroup authority’s decisions? First, we would 
not expect people to discard the value of an 
opportunity to voice their opinion. After all, 
when an authority is supposedly biased in favor 
of oneself, an opportunity to voice should still 
indicate process control, as well as that one is 
respected by the authority, which should be 
particularly self-relevant in the case of an ingroup 
authority. As a result, and in contrast to what we 
found in the present research, we would expect 
people to react positively to an opportunity to 
voice from an ingroup authority even when the 
authority has a reputation of bias. 
Second, concerns that one might be favored 
over outgroup members should not cause 
people to attribute unfavorable outcomes to 
discrimination. If anything, favorable outcomes 
should be attributed to (positive) discrimination. 
However, people might be reluctant to conclude 
that an ingroup authority has discriminated an 
outgroup member solely based on the favorabil-
ity of an outcome, particularly if the reputation 
of bias stems from outgroup members. Aside 
from a favorable outcome for themselves, we 
suspect that people may require less ambiguous 
evidence that the procedure was unfair in order 
to conclude that group membership played a 
role in the decision process. Thus, in the case 
of an ingroup authority, it seems plausible that 
authority reputation, outcome favorability and 
procedural fairness may all interact to shape 
reactions to decisions. In short, we think the 
present results are specific to reactions to 
outgroup authorities, not authorities in gen-
eral, and we would expect rather different 
psychological processes to operate and different 
reactions to emerge when an ingroup authority 
has a reputation of being biased. 
Obviously, the ideas outlined above have yet 
to be tested empirically. The main reason we 
chose not to examine these issues in the pre-
sent research was parsimony. Ultimately, our 
main objective in this line of research was to 
understand the consequences of expecting an 
outgroup authority to be biased against oneself 
based on one’s group membership. As indicated 
by the experimental designs in the present 
research, explaining these processes was already 
quite complex. We were therefore reluctant to 
add further complexity that might enable us to 
additionally address the rather different ques-
tion of what the consequences are of expecting 
an ingroup authority to be biased in favor of 
oneself based on one’s group membership. 
Nevertheless, because we would expect rather 
different psychological processes to operate, we 
do think this is an interesting issue that might 
be further examined in future research.
To conclude, the fi ndings of the present re-
search are important as they provide novel 
information about the psychological processes 
involved in reactions to outgroup authorities’ 
decisions. The main message to social justice 
scholars conveyed by the present research is that 
it is of utmost importance to consider people’s 
expectations of outgroup members as biased in 
order to understand reactions to decisions made 
by outgroup authorities. Expectations of bias 
are important to consider in such situations 
because they can affect the infl uence of pro-
cedural fairness as well as outcome favorability. 
Finally, from a practical perspective, our fi ndings 
suggest ways to alter reactions to outgroup 
authorities’ decisions such that the infl uence 
of procedural fairness can be increased and 
effects of outcome favorability can be reduced. 
Such information is of great practical value, 
in particular as many societal resources are 
expected to become increasingly scarce. The 
main message to authorities allocating resources 
between members of different groups or sub-
groups is that there may be much to be gained 
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in providing explicit and truthful information 
about absence of bias. Such demonstrations can 
pave the way for less outcome oriented reactions 
to the authority’s decisions, and for a stronger 
infl uence of procedural fairness. 
Notes
1. In the present article bias refers specifi cally 
to a tendency to favor certain individuals over 
others in allocation decisions. For example, an 
authority with a tendency to favor members of 
his/her ingroup over members of an outgroup 
would be considered as biased from this 
perspective. 
2. The fact that the number of male and female 
participants is the same as in Study 1 is 
coincidental. The studies were not run at the 
same time, nor using the same participants. 
3. Not surprisingly, there was a moderate negative 
correlation between protest intentions and 
treatment satisfaction (r = –.52, p < .001), as 
well as between protest intentions and outcome 
fairness (r = –.37, p < .001). Finally there 
was a moderate positive correlation between 
treatment satisfaction and outcome fairness 
(r = .51, p < .001). To confi rm our conceptual 
differentiation between these three dependent 
variables, we performed a Principal Components 
Analysis (with Varimax rotation) on all the 
items. This analysis supported our three-factor 
solution. The three factors accounted for a total 
of 82% of the variance, and all items showed 
high factor loadings on the relevant factor 
(factor loadings > .76), and low loadings on 
other factors (factor loadings < .33). 
4. We also checked whether our results were 
affected by participants’ expressed opinions on 
how to allocate the bonus. Overall, participants 
in the voice condition preferred themselves 
rather than the other to receive the bonus. 
Furthermore, participants expressed more 
satisfaction with their treatment and 
perceived the outcome as more fair when 
the authority’s decision was consistent with 
their own preferences. Importantly, however, 
participants’ expressed opinions as well as their 
reactions to the consistency between 
their expressed opinion and the decision 
outcome were unaffected by the authority 
reputation manipulation. Thus, participants’ 
expressed opinions and the consistency 
between their expressed opinions and the 
decision outcome do not contribute to our main 
results.
5. We also ruled out two alternative mediating 
processes. First of all we tested whether outcome 
fairness mediated the authority reputation by 
procedure interaction on intentions to protest. 
However, outcome fairness was not predicted 
by the authority reputation by procedure 
interaction (β = .10, p = .26). Moreover, a 
Sobel test confi rmed that the authority 
reputation by procedure effect on intentions to 
protest was not mediated by outcome fairness 
(Z = –1.09, ns). Second, we also tested whether 
treatment satisfaction mediated the authority 
reputation by outcome interaction on intentions 
to protest. However, treatment satisfaction 
was not predicted by the authority reputation 
by outcome interaction (β = –.05, p = .55). A 
Sobel test further confi rmed that the authority 
reputation by outcome effect on intentions 
to protest was not mediated by treatment 
satisfaction (Z = 0.58, ns). 
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